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Abstract 
 
Penumetcha, Dinesh Varma. M.S.Egr., Department of Electrical Engineering, Wright 
State Unviersity, 2015. “Hardware Trojan detection in cryptography IP cores by library 
encoding method” 
 
 
Security is the primary issue in current internet world through both software and 
hardware. The ever increase in demand of consumer electronics requires less design 
cycle. To speedup design cycle, companies are approaching third parties for common 
applications IPs like USB, cryptography, DSP etc. These third parties can introduce a 
malicious content, which is called Trojan. Trojan in the netlist can activate only with 
special input/trigger. Available Trojan detection techniques like delay, area, power 
fingerprinting techniques and Automatic Test Pattern Generator (ATPG) method are not 
suitable as they take more time, less accurate. This thesis presents a hardware Trojan 
detection in cryptography IP cores by library encoding method. The final netlist of 
cryptography IP cores are encoded and decoded by using a script written in python to 
protect the design from Trojan insertion. This method of encoding and decoding detects 
even 0.0008% of Trojan area and disable the Trojan from activation.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
In the era of connected world where machine to machine communication significantly 
evolves a new market called Internet of Things (IoT). As per latest technology reports, 
there will be more than 50 billion [1] devices to be connected over internet in next 5 
years. So the major market share will go to the world of semiconductor companies which 
design Integrated Circuits (IC’s). Though IoT will make the environment around us 
smarter, security is a primary concern. Also with the new demand in IC market and 
globalization of foundries; there raises a question of security. These questions about 
security result in evolving the new term called hardware cryptography, where the designs 
can either be in system level, Intellectual Property (IP) level, RTL level, gate level design 
or layout level designs securing from Hardware Trojans [2]. 
Hardware Trojan is an undesired design in circuit which alters the functionality or 
destroys the complete circuit. With the intrusion of hardware Trojans into the world of 
integrated circuits, which are backbone for all electronic devices from mobiles to defense 
applications, securing IC’s becomes a major problem. These Hardware Trojans inserted 
into final IC’s like Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASIC) or reconfigurable 
devices like Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) make IC’s malfunction or steal 
information potentially. Due to these kind of threats, defense agencies like DARPA 
initiated research in those areas to secure the IC in applications, where security is most 
important and named it to be “Trust in IC’s“. 
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With the increase in complexity of systems and a need for common functionalities  like 
audio or video encoders and decoders, there evolves a new term called Intellectual 
Property (IP) cores. Many IP vendor companies simply design these IP cores at Register 
Transfer Level (RTL) level and sell them to customers. These third party IP cores are 
more vulnerable [3] to Trojans due to easy netlist access of designs. On an average, one 
system on a chip (SoC) may contain more than ten IP cores, increasing the difficulty in  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
System on Chip 
level 
IP Core level 
CAD Tools level 
Behavioral level 
RTL level 
Netlist level 
Transistor level 
Layout level 
Figure 1.1 Trojan insertion levels 
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detection of Trojans by multifold. As described above, Hardware Trojans can be inserted 
into different levels of chip design. Fig. 1.1 shows the hierarchies of chip design, Trojan 
insertion possibilities and its effects. 
 
System on chip level: This stage functions as collection of different IP cores. In this level 
different IP cores communicate with each other based on the functionality requirements. 
So, the Trojan insertion can disrupt the protocols of the design or change the entire 
functionality of system. 
IP core level: IP cores are the reusable blocks of logic design used in front end digital IC 
design. The most common IP cores are Digital Signal Processing (DSP) cores, 
cryptographic cores or error correction cores. This level of Trojan insertion causes 
damage to the functionality of IP cores like bypassing outputs or altering the outputs 
when certain conditions met etc. [4]. 
CAD Tool level: Electronic Design Automation (EDA) companies like Cadence, Mentor 
Graphics, Synopsys and many more are responsible for developing tools which are 
widely used in almost all stages of chip design. These tools are automated with the help 
of scripting which runs in the background to perform either synthesis or simulation. 
Trojan insertion at this level might be very low, as companies developing the tools take 
necessary steps ensuing high level of security to the customers [5]. 
Behavioral Level: Behavioral means representation of the circuit design in one of the 
available hardware description languages (HDL) like VHDL or Verilog.  Once design is 
described in HDL, then internally it will be realized as the data and control paths describe 
circuit behavior. Trojans mostly attack the signals with low observability [6]. 
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RTL Level: At this level, designs are represented in registers. Even a small malicious 
logic is difficult to detect during standard tests. But research shows that rouge designer 
has large flexibility to insert any kind of Trojan [7]. 
Gate or Netlist Level: Designs represented in RTL level are converted to netlist level 
using available synthesis tools with input as a RTL design file and standard cell library. 
In this level, Trojans can either be in standard cells or in netlist file. Detecting Trojans at 
this level is a bit difficult. 
Transistor level: Trojans inserting at this level may change the transistor width resulting 
in changing power and timing characteristics also varying the device characteristics. 
Layout level: Trojans may change the width of metal layers, size of wires. 
  
1.1. Hardware Trojan Classification 
Trojans are classified based on behavior, activation and action. Each of them is discussed 
below in detailed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hardware Trojans 
Behavior Activation Action 
Combinational 
Sequential 
Always-on 
Internally activated 
Externally activated 
Transmit Information 
Alters specifications 
Alters function 
Function 
Figure 1.2 Hardware Trojan classification 
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Behavior: Malicious circuit design inserted can be subdivided based on the type of 
design implementation. It can either be combinational design or sequential designs. 
Firstly, combinational designs are implemented only with Boolean logic gates as shown 
in Fig. 1.3. Here the Trojan circuit is only activated when a=0, b=1 and c=1, otherwise 
the circuit operates without any malfunction. Once a special test pattern enables the 
Trojan logic, output of S’ is altered. On the other hand, sequential designs contain 
memory elements which is on the right side of Fig. 1.3, where counter value is 
incremented when a=1,b=0 at rising edge of clock. Once counter reaches a specific value 
the functionality of S’ is altered. 
 
Figure 1.3 Trojan (Source MERO rajat subra chakraborthy et.al [8]) 
 
Activation: Combinational and sequential designs are only activated with some special 
patterns.  Based upon method of activation, Trojans are classified as Always-On, 
Internally activated and externally activated. 
Always-On Trojans do not need any special inputs to be triggered i.e. in always-on type a 
simple ex-or gate can be inserted. An internal signal is connected to one of the inputs and 
logic ‘1’ to another. The result of this type of Trojan is a complement of the internal 
signal. 
 
Figure 1.4 Simple XOR gate 
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Internally activated Trojans are not activated till specific condition is met .i.e. Trojans can 
be activated only with special patterns. Activated Trojan modify the functionality of 
designs.  In externally activated, the adversary drives an external signal to activate 
Trojans [9].      
Action: Activated Trojan can either bypass key information of user, named as transmit 
information, alter function or specifications. Author in [9] describes a modify function, 
Trojan alters chip function by adding an extra logic or destroying entire chip, whereas 
modify specification Trojans alter properties like delay by modifying transistor 
parameters. Transmit information type Trojans may compromise sensitive information 
either by radio emissions or through covert channels built at the output of altered circuit. 
1.2. Trojan Detection Techniques 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.5 Hardware Trojans detection classification 
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Lot of research has been going on in the area of Trojan detections. Till now, there is no 
single method detecting all the existing Trojans. Trojans can be detected at different 
levels of design, and the techniques depend on chip manufacturing steps. This level of 
Trojan detection technique is subdivided into post fabrication and pre fabrication. 
Post fabrication detection technique  
If a team of designers and testers are unable to detect Trojans in the front end fabrication 
of the chip design, then it should be detected in post fabrication before it is released to 
consumers. Post fabrication techniques are subdivided into physical testing and 
monitoring parameters like power, delays on chip. 
 
Physical testing 
Scanning Optical Microscope (SOM) method scans IC’s by projecting narrow laser beam 
on to chips revealing circuit functionality at the transistor level. This method can also be 
named as forensic analysis of microelectronic circuits. In this method, the change in 
electrical properties of IC due to laser projection are documented in [10].  
Scanning electron Microscope (SEM) is a nondestructive method which can precisely 
provide images of high resolution and long depth of field. This method is used in military 
and high reliability areas, but requires a large equipment with Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) 
and vacuum enclosure.  
Charge Induced Voltage Alteration (CIVA) and Light Induced Voltage alteration (LIVA) 
are imaging techniques used to localize defects. These techniques can either be through 
electron interaction or photon interaction. LIVA technique detects junction related 
defects whereas CIVA is used to localize open interconnections [11]. 
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Picosecond imaging circuit analysis (PICA) [12] method was invented at IBM to analyze 
the emitted photons during device switching. When light source is projected to a Device 
under Test (DUT), infrared detector captures switching time and the location such that 
one can localize the Trojan using this fault detection technique.  
These physical techniques need a sophisticated equipment and environment which comes 
at higher cost. For a SoC design with more than 2 billion gates it may take longer time to 
narrow down the Trojan circuit.   
On chip monitors: 
Another method of Trojan detection after fabrication is on chip monitors. In this method 
Trojans can be detected either by placing sensors like voltage, current on chip at different 
locations to monitor the variations or using side channel analysis where Trojans can be 
detected by analyzing power, current or delay.   
Pre fabrication detection technique  
Detecting Trojan in front end design is a lot easier as adversary has access to netlist level 
designs. 
Detection methods in prefabrication can be divided in two. 
1. Fingerprint method 
2. ATPG testing method 
Fingerprint method is mostly used while detecting Trojans in soft IP cores rather than 
entire system. In this method, most of designers assume of having a golden IP which is 
Trojan free design and compares the area, delay and power of golden IP to Trojan circuit. 
These golden values are known as fingerprints.  
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ATPG testing method:  
Trojans are more prone to the signal that have low controllability and low observability. 
A Trojan will be a small gate which is used to extract secret key or alters functionality of 
the output. Using Automatic Test Pattern Generation (ATPG) tools, one can generate 
patterns for test (PFT) to detect stuck at 0 and stuck at 1 faults. Built in Self-Test (BIST), 
Design for Test (DFT) are methods to test the circuit with minimal overhead to design. 
Patterns generated for Trojan free circuit might not satisfy for malicious design as most 
of Trojans are activated only with special pattern. Trojan detection by DFT and PFT 
methods give poor results. 
 
1.3.  Motivation 
 
With the ever increasing market of electronics, designers are relying on third 
party IP cores to speed up design time cycle. These third party IP cores can easily insert 
Trojans. The third party sources share either RTL design or a netlist file of the design. As 
the number of gates in netlist file is in tens of thousands, even a small change either by 
inserting or by modifying the netlist can alter the design functionality making the Trojan 
difficult to detect. Of the available IP cores, major security issues are in cryptographic IP 
cores. The sole purpose of inserting a Cryptography IP core design is to pass secret 
information only between sender and a receiver. A simple multiplexed Trojan design can 
reveal secret data without encrypting it.  
None of all the available pre fabrication Trojan detection techniques, detects 
Trojan at the netlist level. The Trojan insertion at low controllability and observability 
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signal makes it difficult to detect in ATPG testing. Also fingerprinting method is very 
difficult as the Trojan area and power are very small.  
The motivation of securing third party IP cores leads to implementation of two 
different cryptographic IP cores named Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and 
International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA); generating netlist files by using 
industry standard Cadence RTL compiler tool. AES and IDEA encryption and decryption 
IP cores functionality are verified on Xilinx Virtex6 FPGA board. A novel library 
encoding method to detect and nullify the Trojan functionality in the netlist files is 
implemented in TSMC 0.25um technology. This library encoding method is suitable for 
all third party IP cores protecting the design even from smaller Trojans. 
 
1.4. Thesis Organization 
 
This thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 explains the basics of AES encryption 
and decryption with an example of data transforming in each and every round. AES 
encryption and decryption designs are implemented in VHDL and MATAB. Chapter 3 
discusses the operation and internal components of IDEA encryption and decryption, 
these designs are implemented in VHDL and MATAB. Chapter 4 discusses library 
encoding method and the implementation results. Chapter5 presents a Graphical User 
Interface designed in MATLAB, embedded AES and IDEA encryption functionalities. 
The GUI also generates corresponding VHDL files based on user selection. Conclusion 
and future work are termed in chapter 6. 
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2. ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD 
 
With evolution of information, where most applications are on digital data, a secure 
environment is needed to protect data from eavesdropper. In order to improve 
confidentiality of data, good cryptographic algorithms are required to encrypt data before 
transmitting it, in any of possible communication methods. The main purpose of having 
cryptic techniques is to have secure and authentic communication between both parties. 
Till date there are various encryption algorithms available in industry, but United States 
(US) government Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) standardizes only 
algorithms which can be adapted to protect sensitive data. 
 
Of all encryption algorithms, FIPS standardized Data Encryption Standard (DES) as 
first encryption standard was created in 1977. In Mid-90’s brute force attack on DES 
made it vulnerable. So in 1997, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
announced a competition to build an Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) as a next 
encryption standard. After rigorous testing of all submissions, Rijndael was named as an 
AES standard and named it as FIPS PUB 197 in 2001.  
  
Encryption techniques are broadly divided into symmetric and asymmetric based on 
key. In symmetric encryption, both parties, sender and the receiver, use same 
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cryptographic key. On the other hand, asymmetric key also known as public key 
cryptography have two keys, of which one is private and the other is public.  
AES is a symmetric encryption standard by NIST for all sorts of data like email, 
personal identification numbers and many more [13]. Cryptographic algorithms like AES 
can be implemented either in software or hardware, depends upon requirements. Software 
implementations are usually easy to be developed and mostly used in less secure 
applications, as they are more prone to reverse engineering [14][15]. Another major 
setback in software implementation is low speed operation. Hardware implementation of 
cryptographic algorithms is more secure for keys compared to software and also data can 
operate at higher speeds.  
Applications of hardware encryption are on USB memory stick, USB secure dongles 
and hard drives. Recently, Intel 2010 core processor family has built in hardware 
cryptographic design which can be accessed through AES new instructions (AES 
NI)[16].  
Three different versions of AES are available based on the key size (128, 192 and 
256). This chapter discuss the concepts of AES128 encryption algorithm and hardware 
implementation in VHDL. Functional verification of AES128 encryption at simulation 
level in Modelsim and hardware implementation in Xilinx Virtex 6 FPGA board are also 
included in this chapter. 
2.1. AES 128 Overview 
 
Rijndael algorithm was developed by Joan Daemen and Vincent Rijmen to 
participate in National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) competition for data 
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encryption standard.  Of all 15 submissions Rijndael algorithm was named as Federal 
Information Processing standards (FIPS) publication 197. 
In AES encryption, input data are plaintext and key whereas output is ciphertext. 
AES is a symmetric key algorithm, means same key is used for both encryption and 
decryption. Symmetric key algorithm is subdivided into stream cipher and block cipher. 
In stream cipher, each bit is encrypted individually, whereas in block cipher, encryption 
is done by group of bits. An AES128 is a symmetric block cipher encryption with 8 bit 
block size. AES128 have 16 blocks where each block is 8 bits. 
Three versions of AES are available based on size of the key (128, 192 and 256), 
plaintext (128 bit). Plaintext is divided into sets of 32 bits called block size Nb = 128/32 
= 4. Key is also divided into sets of 32 bits but value varies with version. For AES 192 
Nk = 192/32 = 6. Table 2.1 illustrates key length and block size for all versions and 
relation between Key length Nk and Number of rounds Nr = Nk + 6  
 
  Table 2.1 Key length, Block size and Number of rounds for AES 128, 192, 256 
 
AES type Key length 
Nk 
Block size 
Nb 
Number of rounds 
Nr = Nk + 6 
AES 128 4 4 10 
AES 192 6 4 12 
AES 256 8 4 14 
 
The design algorithm and implementation of this AES128 are discussed in the 
following sections  
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For AES128 data input, secure key and data output are 128 bits. As AES is a 
block cipher, 128 bit data is stored as 4*4 array which is shown in fig 2.1. 128 bit input 
data is divided into blocks of 8 bits, LSB 8 bits are stored in
 
 and the next 8 LSB bits 
in  
 and so on.  
    
    
    
    
 
Figure 2.1 4*4 array representation of input 128 bit data 
 
If data input is less than 128 bits, zeros are padded to MSBs. In hardware 
implementation, as data only deals with binary digits, ASCII data format is used to 
represent characters. Each entry in 4*4 array is 8 bits, with first 8 LSBs are stored in (0, 
0) index and next LSBs are stored in (1, 0) and so on. Once input data is arranged in an 
array as shown in figure 2.1, 128 bit key is also represented in array by the same manner. 
2.2. Rijndael algorithm basic components 
 
In order to obtain a cipher text in AES 128, input data and key are passed through 
initial transformation followed by 10 rounds of transformations. Fig 2.2 explains the 
sequence of operations in every round. In the initial round plaintext is XORed with Add 
Round Key and the result is passed to first round. First Nine rounds of AES do four 
transformation functions: byte substitution, shift rows, mix columns and add round key. 
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With only three transformations in the final round excluding mix columns step, cipher 
text is obtained. 
 
 
Figure 2.2 AES Encryption Algorithm (Source: [17] William stallings pg 154 ) 
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2.3. Rijndael Transformations 
Transformations are the sub components of AES algorithm. The four 
transformations are 
 Byte Substitution: A byte will be replaced by the corresponding value of 
Substitution box array  
 Shift rows: Shift 1,2,3 rows of two dimensional array 
 Mix columns: Multiply standard array matrix with array output of shift 
row transformation 
 Key expansion: Increase the key size by (Nr +1)*128 bits or (Nr+1)*16 
Bytes  
2.3.1. Byte substitution: 
Whenever byte substitution component is called, each and every input of the array is 
replaced by corresponding value in figure 2.3. Each entry of figure 2.3 is represented in 
hexadecimal format.   
17 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Substitution Box array 
 
Each and every entry of an array is 8 bits, substitution value is explained with an 
example. 
 Input = 10110011 
 Convert input to Hexadecimal format = B3 
 Now from Bth row and 3rd column in the figure 2.3, the substitution value for B3 
is 6D 
2.3.2. Shift rows 
In this component, rows are circularly left shifted by row number. The starting 
row number is zero. Figure 2.4 shows row shifting, the zeroth row remains unchanged. 
Row1 elements are left shifted by 1 element. Similarly row 2 and row 3 are shifted by 2 
and 3 elements respectively.  
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Figure 2.4 Shift rows of an array 
2.3.3. Mix columns 
This step performs matrix multiplication and logical operations on data array with 
standard matrix of table 2.2 and data of table 2.3 
Table 2.2 Standard Matrix 
02 03 01 01 
01 02 03 01 
01 01 02 03 
03 01 01 02 
 
Table 2.3 Data Matrix 
D4 10 60 B0 
CC 21 35 AB 
04 3F 50 90 
32 FF 05 10 
Steps to perform Matrix Multiplication are summarized in the following  
● Row of one matrix is multiplied with column of the second. 
● When multiplying data with 2, do left shift by 1 bit 
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○ If MSB of data is ‘1’ then after left shift XOR 00011011(1B), 
substitution box is generated using 1B polynomial. 
○ if MSB is Zero then result is the output of left shift 
● When multiplying data with 3, do left shift by 1 bit and XOR data 
○ conditions for MSB is same as above 
● Addition in matrix multiplication can be done with XOR 
An example of performing Matrix Multiplication is given below by multiplying first row of 
standard matrix with first column of Data matrix, result is first element of final matrix  
Z(0,0) =  02*D4  xor  03*CC xor 01*04 xor 01*32 
02*D4   
Convert D4 to binary => 1101 0100, as multiplying by 2 is a left shift 
Left shift => 1010 1000 
MSB of D4 is 1, XOR the left shift output with “1B” 
   1010 1000 
   0001 1011 XOR 
   1011 0011 
03*CC 
 As 03 = 11 in binary which is same as (10 XOR 01) 
 (1100 1100 * (10 XOR 01)) 
 (1100 1100 * 10)  XOR (1100 1100 * 01) 
 1100 1100 * 10 = 1001 1000 XOR 0001 1011 (because MSB of CC is 1) 
     = 1000 0011 
1000 0011 XOR 1100 1100 
0100 1111 
 01*04 
 0000 0100 
01*32 
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 0011 0010 
 
Z (0, 0) = 1100 1010 
 
Z (1, 0) = 01*D4 xor 02*CC xor 03*04 xor 01*32 
 = 1101 0100 xor 1000 0011 xor 0000 1100 xor 0011 0010 
 = 0110 1001 
 
Final array is represented in table 2.4 
    Table 2.4 final array 
CA 83 CA 1D 
69 EC FF 46 
46 55 FA 10 
CB CB CF D0 
2.3.4. Key expansion 
As mentioned before AES 128 has 10 rounds of data transformation, the key 
expansion is needed to assign a new key for every round. Key expansion has to be done 
for 10 rounds and an initial round with a total of 44 words (176 bytes) and each word 
width is 32 bits. 
 
Figure 2.5 Conversion of 8 bit keys to 32 bit words 
21 
 
 
The first 4 words are derived from initial key. Follow the below sequence of steps to 
obtain full key expansion 
1. For every 4th word i.e. w3, w7 … perform circularly left shift. 
a. Ex: w3= a2 bc dc 1f   =>  bc dc 1f a2 
2. Output of left shift vector is replaced by the byte substitution value  
a. Ex bc dc 1f a2 => 65 86 c0 3a 
3. For every round excluding initial round, byte substitution output values are 
XORed with a RCON vector. Each round has its own RCON vector [17]. 
a. Rcon(1) = 01 00 00 00 
b. Rcon(2) = 02 00 00 00 
c. Rcon(3) = 04 00 00 00 
d. Rcon(4) = 08 00 00 00 
e. Rcon(5) = 10 00 00 00 
f. Rcon(6) = 20 00 00 00 
g. Rcon(7) = 40 00 00 00 
h. Rcon(8) = 80 00 00 00 
i. Rcon(9) = 1B 00 00 00 
j. Rcon(10) = 36 00 00 00 
For first round  65 86 c0 3a xor 01 00 00 00  =>  64 86 c0 3a   = Z1 
4. w4,w5,w6 and w7 are obtained as follows [17] 
a. w4 = w0 XOR Z1 
b. w5 = w4 XOR w1 
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c. w6 = w5 XOR w2 
d. w7 = w6 XOR w3 
5. To obtain w8 value, w7 vector is circularly left shifted with its output byte 
substituted. Output of byte substitution is XORed with Rcon(2). The result is 
called Z2. 
a. w8 = w4 xor Z2 
b. w9 = w8 xor w5 
c. w10 = w9 xor w6 
d. w11 = w10 xor w7 
6. Continue the above steps till all w0 - w43 vectors are derived 
 
Fig 2.6 explains the detailed components to be used in every round  
 
Figure 2.6 Components in a round 
Fig 2.6 with Key expansion component, get the necessary keys to all stages but in an Add 
round key component of above algorithm, takes 4 words i.e. w0-w3 and convert them 
back to 4*4 array as shown in figure 2.7 
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2.4. AES 128 Design Implementation  
AES 128 encryption is implemented in VHDL using top down approach model. 
Top down encryption is subdivided into small components like byte substitution, shift 
rows, mix columns and key expansion 
Top level design of AES 128 encryption is shown in figure 2.8 
 
 
 
 
 
k0 
k1
  
k2 
k3 
k5 
k6 
k7 
k4 
k9 
k10 
k11 
k8 
k13 
k14 
k15 
k12 
w0 w1 w2 w3 
ki - key 8 bits 
wi - word 32 bits 
 
31 0 
w0 
w0 (31 downto 24) -> k0 
w0 (23 downto 16) -> k1 
w0 (15 downto 8)   -> k2 
w0 (7 downto 0)     -> k3 
 
 
 
 
data_in 128 bits 
key 128 bits 
encrypt_data 128 bits 
byte 
substitution 
row shift 
Mix 
columns 
Key 
expansion 
Figure 2.7 Conversion of 32 bit vector to 4*4 array 
Figure 2.8 Top level design of AES 128 Encryption 
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Byte substitution block level design 
 
Using this component we can design byte substitution for a 4*4 array 
 
Key expansion block design 
 
 
data_in   8 bits 
data_out 8 bits 
 
 
 AES128_key_expansion 
key 128 bits 
w0   32 bits 
w43   32 bits 
Figure 2.9 Block level representation of byte substitution 
Figure 2.10 Block level representation of key expansion 
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2.5. Hardware Implementation 
2.5.1. FPGA 
In the present semiconductor market, the complexity of System on Chip (SoC) 
increases a lot. To meet existing market demand, Field Programmable Gate Array 
(FPGA) prototyping is the best way to perform the pre silicon validation and also 
quickens software development of the system.  
Host PC is connected to the FPGA device using JTAG connection port. One can 
debug the design on FPGA using Chipscope Pro core. Chipscope can access every port 
through JTAG and cores. 
Chipscope basically three types of IP cores. 
ICON: Integrated controller core, provides communication between ILA, VIO and JTAG 
scan port.  
ILA: Integrated Logic Analyzer core can be used to monitor any internal signals of the 
design. Debugger can also set the trigger points 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JTAG 
Interface 
PC 
ICON VIO 
Design modules 
Control0 
Sync_out Sync_in 
Figure 2.11 Design interface with Chipscope cores 
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VIO: Variable Input and Output core can drive and monitor the signals during run time. 
The inputs to design are outputs of VIO core whereas the outputs of design are inputs to 
the VIO core 
 
The typical block diagram of FPGA debugging and prototyping is shown in fig 
2.11. JTAG interface connects the PC and FPGA device. On the FPGA device, design 
modules can be anything that is to be prototyped. AES, IDEA encryption and decryption 
IP cores are prototyped on FPGA. ICON and VIO cores are used to feed the data during 
run time and helps monitoring results.  
AES Encryption IP 
 
Structural design of AES encryption occupies only 2527 slices and delay of 
structural design is larger compared to RTL design. The throughput of AES RTL IP core 
is (11*128 * f (MHz))/48, for clock rate at 294.11MHz (294.11MHz is the maximum 
clock frequency obtained in Virtex6 FPGA board implementation) throughput is 8627 
Mbps. The throughput of structural design is 2167.2 Mbps. 
 
Table 2.5 AES encryption Virtex6 board Results 
 Structural Design RTL Design 
Number of Occupied Slices 2527   (6%) 1240 (3%) 
Number of Slice registers  0 1621   (1%) 
Number of Slice LUTs 8957        (5%) 4145   (1%) 
Delay (synthesis report) 32.842ns Minimum Clock period 3.32ns 
Post PAR Delay 59.06 ns 3.4 ns *  
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AES Decryption 
 
Structural design of AES decryption occupies only 3642 slices. Delay of 
structural design is larger compared to RTL design. The throughput of AES RTL IP core 
is (11*128 * f (MHz))/58, for clock rate at 235.84MHz (253.84 MHz is the maximum 
clock frequency obtained in Virtex6 FPGA board implementation) throughput is 5725.21 
Mbps. The throughput of structural design is 1878.04 Mbps 
 
Table 2.6 AES encryption Virtex6 board Results 
 Structural 
Design 
RTL Design 
Number of Occupied 
Slices 
3642   (9%) 1458 (3%) 
Number of Slice registers  0 1621   (1%) 
Number of Slice LUTs 11271        (7%) 4702   (3%) 
Delay (synthesis report) 62.122 ns Minimum Clock period 
4.151ns 
Post PAR Delay 68.156 ns 4.24 ns *  
 
AES Encryption and Decryption FPGA result 
Key_in and Data_in are the inputs of AES Encryption cryptographic IP core, 
Cipher_Data is the output signal. 
Cipher_Data and Key_in are the inputs of AES Decryption IP core and Original_Data is 
the output signal of Decryption core. 
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Figure 2.12 FPGA result of AES encryption and decryption 
 
2.5.2. ASIC 
Simulation Results 
Simulations results of all the designs are obtained from Mentor Graphics Modelsim 6.6b 
edition. Script is written in TCL to automate the compiling, simulating and adding 
waveforms. The example script is shown below 
vcom *.vhd  
vsim -novopt work.aes_encrypt 
add wave -noupdate -radix hexadecimal sim:/aes_encrypt/* 
log -r /* 
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AES Encryption  
The simulation waveform of AES encryption on Mentor graphics Modelsim is shown in 
Fig. 2.13. The waveform shows input key, data, encrypted result and also shows internal 
round data. 
 
Figure 2.13 simulation result AES encryption 
AES Decryption 
The simulation waveform of AES decryption on Mentor graphics Modelsim is shown in 
Fig. 2.14. The waveform shows input key, encrypted data, original result and also shows 
internal round data. 
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Figure 2.14 simulation result of AES decryption 
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3. INTERNATIONAL DATA ENCRYPTION 
ALGORITHM (IDEA) 
 
IDEA is the most secured cryptic algorithm and needs less hardware resources 
compared to AES [18]. The design area of IDEA is smaller when compared to AES. The 
greatest advantage of IDEA over AES is its 64 bit input data. For small input data in 
AES, more zeroes are to be padded at data input. This section details about IDEA 
algorithm and hardware implementation in VHDL. Functional verification of IDEA 
encryption and decryption at simulation level in Modelsim and at hardware level in 
Xilinx Virtex 6 FPGA board are also included in this chapter. 
3.1. IDEA Algorithm 
 
This section discusses the basic functionality of IDEA encryption and decryption along 
with its internal components. IDEA mainly has two important characteristics. One is 
symmetric cryptic process, implying same key is used for both encryption and decryption; 
another is block cipher where the encryption and decryption data operates in sets of 16bits. 
In IDEA all input data is represented in 16 bit blocks operating internally.  
IDEA cryptography operates on 64 bit input data with a 128 bit key and gives out a 64 
bit cipher output.  IDEA encryption performs 8 rounds of data manipulations and a final 
transformation round. Each round uses six 16 bit keys. Input data manipulations are based 
on those six keys and an additional four block of keys to final round.  So, for all rounds, in 
total 52 keys (8*6 + 4) are needed.  
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3.2. IDEA Encryption Components 
Each round has three following basic components: 
1. Bitwise XOR: performs bitwise XOR on two 16 bit input blocks.  
2. 216 modulo addition: Perform binary addition on two unsigned 16 bit data 
discarding the final carry. The result should not be greater than 65535 in modulo 
addition. 
3. 216+1 modulo multiplication: Perform binary multiplication on two unsigned 16 bit 
data followed by modulo division by 65537, and the final result is 16 bit unsigned 
data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 key expansion 
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Key expansion: 52 block of keys are generated from a primary input of 128 bit key. First 
8 block of keys are generated from 128 bit input key and then circularly left shifted by 25 
bits. These 128 bits are used to generate next 8 block of keys. Continue this procedure 
until 52 block of keys obtained as shown in Fig. 3.1. Table I list keys used in every round 
of Encryption. 
 
Table 3.1 Sub keys to Encryption Rounds 
 
With the basic components, the following sequence of operations are performed in 1 to 
8 rounds of an IP core. 
1. Modulo multiplication of Key0 and Data0  
2. Modulo addition of Key1 and Data1 
3. Modulo addition of Key2 and Data2 
4. Modulo multiplication of Key3 and Data3 
5. Bitwise XOR of step1 and step3 outputs 
6. Bitwise XOR of step2 and step4 outputs 
7. Modulo multiplication of step5 output and key4 
8. Modulo addition of step 6 and 7 outputs 
9. Modulo multiplication of step8 output and key5 
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10. Modulo addition of step7 and 9 outputs 
11. Bitwise XOR of step 1 and 9 outputs 
12. Bitwise XOR of step 2 and 10 outputs 
13. Bitwise XOR of step 3 and 9 outputs 
14. Bitwise XOR of step4 and 10 outputs 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 IDEA Internal implementation 
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The outputs of round 8 is given to concluding round to get the final cipher data as 
shown in Fig. 3.2. Due to multiple transformation of data in rounds with a 128 bit key, 
this algorithm is highly secured. 
 
In decryption, encrypted data is recovered by using same key used in encryption step 
due to symmetric characteristic. In order to recover the cipher data, decryption also uses 
the same basic components that is used in encryption design but with a different sub key 
blocks. Sub key blocks to every decryption round are listed in Table 3.2. Comparing Table 
3.1 and Table 3.2, to recover the original data, 1st and 4th keys of decryption round 1 are 
the multiplicative inverse of the final round keys; whereas 2nd and 3rd are additive inverse 
keys; 5th and 6th keys of round 1 are from round 8 (5th and 6th) keys. Similarly, keys to all 
rounds can be calculated. 
  
In addition to the above basic components decryption needs additive and multiplicative 
inverse components to get inversion keys. 
Additive inverse of 216 is 2’s complement. 
Multiplicative inverse of 216+1 modulo multiplication is complicated and so is calculated 
using extended Euclidean algorithm [19]. 
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Table 3.2 Sub keys to Decryption 
 
3.3. Design Implementation 
IDEA Encryption is implemented using VHDL in top down hierarchal approach. 
Encryption design is implemented using bitwise XOR, 216+1 modulo multiplication and 
216 modulo addition components. The top level design of IDEA encryption is as shown in 
fig 3.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Top Level design of IDEA Encryption 
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Key Expansion 
Key expansion block takes 128 bit input data and gives 52 sub keys where each 
sub key is 16 bit wide. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bitwise XOR, modulo addition and modulo multiplication blocks take two 16 bit data 
and gives out 16 bit data.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IDEA_Key_expansion 
Key 128 
bits 
 Key0 16 
bits 
 
Key51 16 bits 
 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
 
 
Figure 3.4 IDEA key expansion design block diagram 
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IDEA Encryption 
The simulation waveform of IDEA encryption on Mentor graphics Modelsim is shown in 
Fig. 3.5. The waveform shows input key, data, encrypted result and also shows internal 
round data. 
 
Figure 3.5 Simulation result of IDEA encryption 
 
Structural design of IDEA encryption occupies only 1146 slices. Delay of 
structural design is larger compared to RTL design. The throughput of IDEA RTL IP 
core is (9*64 * f (MHz))/81, for clock rate at 107.52MHz (107.52MHz is the maximum 
clock frequency obtained in Virtex6 FPGA board implementation) throughput is 764.59 
Mbps. The throughput of structural design is 176.24 Mbps. 
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Table 3.3 IDEA encryption Virtex6 board Results 
 Structural 
Design 
RTL- Pipeline 
Number of Occupied 
Slices 
1146   (3%) 1196 (3%) 
Number of Slice 
registers  
0 2881 (1%) 
Number of Slice LUTs 2867        (1%) 3252 (2%) 
Delay (synthesis report) 250.316ns Minimum Clock period 
9.218ns 
Post PAR Delay 363.148 ns 9.3n 
 
IDEA Decryption 
The simulation waveform of IDEA decryption on Mentor graphics Modelsim is 
shown in Fig. 3.6. The waveform shows input cipher data, key, original data and also 
shows intermediate data of every round.  
 
Figure 3.6 Simulation result of IDEA decryption 
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 Structural design of IDEA decryption occupies only 1044 slices. Delay of 
structural design is larger compared to RTL design. The throughput of IDEA RTL IP 
core is (9*64 * f (MHz))/81, for clock rate at 108.48MHz (108.48 MHz is the maximum 
clock frequency obtained in Virtex6 FPGA board implementation) throughput is 771.41 
Mbps. The throughput of structural design is 214.1 Mbps 
Table 3.4 IDEA decryption Virtex6 board Results 
 Structural 
Design 
RTL Pipeline design 
Number of Occupied 
Slices 
1044   (2%) 956 (2%) 
Number of Slice 
registers  
0 2177 (1%) 
Number of Slice LUTs 2709        (1%) 2912 
Delay (synthesis report) 248.739ns Minimum Clock period 
9.218ns 
Post PAR Delay 298.915 ns 9.3n 
 
Comparing Table 2.4 and 2.5 results with Table 3.3 and 3.4, IDEA consume only 
one fourth of LUTs but the disadvantage is higher delay.  Advantage of IDEA is that, 
internal computations consume only digital logic whereas AES implementation need more 
LUTs for s-box implementation. 
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4. LIBRARY ENCODING 
 
Third party IP core such as cryptography is shared by vendors in netlist format. These 
netlist files are good place to insert a hardware Trojan. Earlier, section 1 discussed about 
the types of pre fabrication detection techniques and its disadvantages. This section 
introduces a new methodology protecting the netlist from inserting a Trojan and also a 
Trojan detection method at netlist level of chip designing. 
4.1. Methodology 
The vtvtlib25 standard cell library for TSMC 0.25um technology is used for all 
netlist generations in ASIC design. This library contains 36 cells of different drive 
strengths. These 36 cells are divided into groups; based on number of input and output 
pins. 
Following are some of the cells which fall under two input and one output pin group. 
and2_1, nand2_1, xor2_1, xnor2_1, mux2_1, or2_1, nor2_1, lp2_1 
Library encoding method maps any cell to any other cell, here is a mapping of one such 
configuration.  
 
And2_1        =>  xor2_1 
Nand2_1      => xnor2_1 
Xor2_1         => and2_1 
Xnor2_1       => nand2_1 
Mux2_1        => or2_1 
Lp2_1           => nor2_1  
Or2_1           => mux2_1 
Nor2_1         => lp2_1 
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Whenever the encoding script sees the and2_1 gate, the functionality is modified to 
xor2_1 gate as per assigned mapping configurations. Fig. 4.1. Shows the block diagram 
of netlist encoding by library encoding method. The input file to the encoder is a 
synthesized netlist and the output is a encoded netlist file. Both the input and output files 
are in verilog hardware description language. 
 
Figure 4.1 Netlist encoding 
To decode the netlist, the mapped library is remapped to get to the original netlist file as 
follows. 
 
Xor2_1         => and2_1 
Xnor2_1       => nand2_1 
And2_1        =>  xor2_1 
Nand2_1      => xnor2_1 
Or2_1           => mux2_1 
Nor2_1         => lp2_1 
Mux2_1        => or2_1 
Lp2_1           => nor2_1  
 
Whenever the decoding script sees the xor2_1 gate, the functionality is modified back to 
and2_1 gate which is the original function of netlist. Fig. 4.2. Shows the block diagram of 
netlist decoding by library encoding method. Input file to decoder is the encoded netlist 
and the output is decoded netlist file which is original synthesized netlist file. Both input 
and output files of netlist decoding are written in verilog hardware description language. 
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Figure 4.2 Netlist decoding 
4.2. Trojan Insertion Design 
 
Modifying the netlist of IP by an eavesdropper alters the design functionality. The typical 
block diagram of the Trojan insertion at netlist level is as shown in Fig 4.3.  
 
Figure 4.3 Trojan Insertion to the encoded netlist file 
 
The design netlist is encoded using library encoding technique before allowing access to 
the snooper. Encoded netlist is the only netlist a snooper can access and may insert 
combinational or sequential type Trojans. Fig. 4.3 shows the Trojan insertion in encoded 
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netlist file. To recover the design, Trojan inserted in encoded netlist file is decoded to 
obtain the original netlist. If intruder inserts or modifies the netlist, the Trojan effect is 
nullified or it may not work in a way the intruder thinks; either can be passing a secret 
information or activating the trigger. This method of encoding ensures high level of 
Trojan detection at netlist level for smaller Trojans. 
4.3. Trojan Effects in Cryptography IP Cores 
 
Intellectual Property (IP) cores are reusable logic designs that are used to speed 
up the design cycle of System on chip (SoC). These IP cores are used as building blocks 
of ASIC designs to meet the market demand. As these IP cores are licensed by third 
parties, raising the question of security at netlist level.  
Of all the available IP cores, security for cryptographic IP cores is of paramount 
importance. If cryptographic IP cores reveals the secret information then there is no need 
for having cryptic blocks. Intruders at this level may alter the encryption and decryption 
designs. So it’s the verification engineer responsibility to verify whether the design is 
performing what it is supposed to and nothing beyond the design specifications. But the 
Trojans can be as small as a simple AND gate or as big as a logic counter which can 
active the trigger to pass on secret the information. Detection of these small Trojans is 
very difficult due to its smaller size when compared to the design.  
 
Fig. 4.4 shows the block diagram of Trojan insertion in the netlist of AES 
Encryption IP core. The functionality of AES encryption IP core is to encrypt 128 bit data 
using 128 secret key and gives output of 128 bit cipher text or data. What if encryption IP 
core is compromised at netlist level? Fig. 4.4 depicts the Trojan insertion at end of 
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encryption where the payload is a simple 2*1 Mux and the trigger can be as simple as an 
AND gate with a select key. The inputs to the payload are cipher text and plain text. 
Whenever trigger is enabled, Trojan sends the plain text directly without any encryption 
and if trigger is disabled AES encryption works as a normal encryption IP core without 
changing the functionality of design.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
Fig. 4.5 shows the block diagram of IDEA encryption IP core with the Trojan. IDEA is 
symmetric type cryptography which encrypts 64 bit plain text using 128 bit secret key 
and sends out 64 bit cipher text.  
Mux Payload has inputs of cipher data and plain data and depend on trigger enabled or 
disabled Trojan activates sending out the data. The trigger is only activated when the 
count reaches a specified number in the design and the count is incremented when key 
meets the specified condition. 
 
AES 
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IP core 
128  
12 128 
Key 
Plain 
Text 
128 
Cipher text 
M
u
x 
2
_1
 
128 
Sel 
Trojan 
Payload 
Figure 4.4 AES Encryption with mux payload 
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The solution to keep the trigger from activation is library encoding. In this method the 
RTL compiler tool writes encoded netlist file. Intruder may access the encoded file and 
insert Trojan as shown in Fig.4.5 to bypasses cipher text. The Encoded netlist protects the 
design from Trojan behavior and alters the Trojan functionality in library decoding. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.4. Synthesis Results 
IP cores are synthesized in cadence RTL compiler by running tcl script. Area, power and 
netlist files are generated.  
Synthesis is performed for three different design types to each and every IP cores. The 
three different design types are Golden IP design, Trojan inserted design and Library 
encoded designs. 
A Golden IP design is the design with no Trojan .i.e. golden IP design gives out the 
perfect functionality of the IP core. 
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64 
Sel 
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Figure 4.5 IDEA Encryption with mux payload 
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In Trojan inserted design, the final netlist after synthesis is re-written and inserted. 
Trojans alter the functionality of the IP core to extract sensitive information. 
In Library encoded design method, the final netlist is encoded using encode python 
script. Script reads the netlist file and encode the gates based on mapping criteria. This 
method protects the design from hardware Trojans. Decode script re-maps IP core 
functionality and nullifies the Trojan design. 
Area and power results are reported to detect the prefabrication Trojans in fingerprinting 
method comparing those to detection techniques with library encoding techniques. 
4.4.1. IDEA Encryption 
 
Golden IP 
Golden IP is the correct functionality of the IP core. Table 4.1 and 4.2 indicates area and 
power results of golden IP obtained from cadence RTL compiler. Fig. 4.6 shows the 
result of IDEA encryption on four sets of data.  
Table 4.1 IDEA encryption golden IP area result 
Instance Cells Cell Area Net Area Total Area 
idea_encrypt 83725 8073893 3544705 11618598 
 
Table 4.2 IDEA encryption golden IP power result 
Instance Cells Leakage 
power 
(nW) 
Dynamic 
power(nW) 
Total 
power(nW) 
idea_encrypt 83725 5195.614 29750137675.957 29750142871.570 
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Figure 4.6 Golden IP IDEA encryption synthesis result 
  
SET1 input and output data of IDEA Encryption 
Inputs 
data_in: 7FA9_1C37_FFB3_DF05 
Key_in:   5A14_FB3E_021C_79E0_6081_46A0_117B_FF03 
Output: 
Encrypt_data: 106B_DBFD_F323_0876 
 
SET2 input and output data of IDEA Encryption 
Inputs 
data_in: 0123_4567_89AB_CDEF 
Key_in:   5A14_FB3E_021C_79E0_6081_46A0_117B_FF03 
Output: 
Encrypt_data: E8A2_45E0_FD18_FE5C 
SET3 input and output data of IDEA Encryption 
Inputs 
data_in: 7FA9_1C37_FFB3_DF05 
Key_in:   5214_FB3E_021C_79E0_6081_46A0_117B_FF03 
Output: 
Encrypt_data: 2874_C20B_8E29_96CE 
 
SET4 input and output data of IDEA Encryption 
Inputs 
data_in: 0123_4567_89AB_CDEF 
Key_in:   5214_FB3E_021C_79E0_6081_46A0_117B_FF03 
Output: 
Encrypt_data: E0F5_0F41_42D8_8143 
 
 
 
49 
 
Trojan Inserted Design: 
A two input Multiplexer is inserted as a Trojan to netlist and the multiplexer payload is 
activated only with a special key.  
Table 4.3 IDEA encryption Trojan inserted design area result 
Instance Cells Cell Area Net Area Total Area 
idea_encrypt_trojan 83993 8098371 3557728 11656099 
 
 
Table 4.4 IDEA encryption Trojan inserted design power result 
Instance Cells Leakage 
power 
(nW) 
Dynamic 
power(nW) 
Total 
power(nW) 
idea_encrypt_troja
n 
8399
3 
5210.85
6 
29928447160.83
1 
9928452371.68
8 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7 Trojan inserted IDEA encryption synthesis result 
  
 
Area and power results of Trojan inserted design are obtained from cadence RTL 
compiler tool. Table 4.3 and 4.4 indicates that area and power are increased by 0.003 and 
0.006 respectively. Fig. 4.7 shows the result of IDEA encryption on four sets of data. In 
the Trojan inserted design, output of IP is input data itself for the first two sets as Trojan 
is activated. IP core works normally, as set3 and set4 keys cannot activate the Trojan. 
 
SET1 input and output data of IDEA Encryption 
Inputs 
data_in: 7FA9_1C37_FFB3_DF05 
Key_in:   5A14_FB3E_021C_79E0_6081_46A0_117B_FF03 
50 
 
Output: 
Encrypt_data: 7FA9_1C37_FFB3_DF05 
 
SET2 input and output data of IDEA Encryption 
Inputs 
data_in: 0123_4567_89AB_CDEF 
Key_in:   5A14_FB3E_021C_79E0_6081_46A0_117B_FF03 
Output: 
Encrypt_data: 0123_4567_89AB_CDEF 
 
 
SET3 input and output data of IDEA Encryption 
Inputs 
data_in: 7FA9_1C37_FFB3_DF05 
Key_in:   5214_FB3E_021C_79E0_6081_46A0_117B_FF03 
Output: 
Encrypt_data: 2874_C20B_8E29_96CE 
 
SET4 input and output data of IDEA Encryption 
Inputs 
data_in: 0123_4567_89AB_CDEF 
Key_in:   5214_FB3E_021C_79E0_6081_46A0_117B_FF03 
Output: 
Encrypt_data: E0F5_0F41_42D8_8143 
 
Library Encoding Method 
In the library encoding design, if the netlist has any malfunction, the output of IP is 
completely different (junk) data. 
 
 
Figure 4.8 library encoding design of IDEA encryption synthesis result 
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Fig. 4.8 shows the result of IDEA encryption on four sets of data. If the output of library 
encoding is different from Golden IP method, it indicates there is some Trojan design in 
the netlist provided by third parties.  
SET1 input and output data of IDEA Encryption 
Inputs 
data_in: 7FA9_1C37_FFB3_DF05 
Key_in:   5A14_FB3E_021C_79E0_6081_46A0_117B_FF03 
Output: 
Encrypt_data: 1029_1835_F323_0804 
SET2 input and output data of IDEA Encryption 
Inputs 
data_in: 0123_4567_89AB_CDEF 
Key_in:   5A14_FB3E_021C_79E0_6081_46A0_117B_FF03 
Output: 
Encrypt_data: 0022_4560_8908_CC4C 
 
SET3 input and output data of IDEA Encryption 
Inputs 
data_in: 7FA9_1C37_FFB3_DF05 
Key_in:   5214_FB3E_021C_79E0_6081_46A0_117B_FF03 
Output: 
Encrypt_data: 2820_0003_8E21_9604 
 
SET4 input and output data of IDEA Encryption 
Inputs 
data_in: 0123_4567_89AB_CDEF 
Key_in:   5214_FB3E_021C_79E0_6081_46A0_117B_FF03 
Output: 
Encrypt_data: 0021_0541_0088_8143 
 
 
4.4.2. IDEA Decryption 
IDEA decryption recovers encrypted data using a key. Due to symmetry property of 
IDEA both encryption and decryption use the same key. 
 
Golden IP 
Golden IP is the correct functionality of IDEA decryption IP core. 
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Table 4.5 IDEA decryption golden IP area result 
Instance Cells Cell Area Net Area Total Area 
idea_decrypt 36370 3391005 1497652 4888657 
 
Table 4.6 IDEA decryption golden IP power result 
Instance Cells Leakage 
power 
(nW) 
Dynamic 
power(nW) 
Total 
power(nW) 
idea_decrypt 36370 2384.673 10816346745.569 10816349130.242 
 
 
 
Figure 4.9 Golden IP IDEA decryption synthesis result  
 
Table 4.5 and 4.6 indicates the area and power results of golden IP obtained from 
cadence RTL compiler. Fig. 4.9 shows the result of IDEA decryption on set1 data. 
SET1 input and output data of IDEA decryption 
Inputs 
Encrypt_data: 106B_DBFD_F323_0876 
Key_in:   5A14_FB3E_021C_79E0_6081_46A0_117B_FF03 
Output: 
Original_data: 7FA9_1C37_FFB3_DF05 
 
The decryption IP core output is primary input data of IDEA encryption. 
 
Trojan Inserted Design: 
A two input multiplexer is inserted as Trojan to netlist and the multiplexer payload is 
activated only with a special key. 
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Table 4.7 IDEA decryption Trojan inserted design area result 
Instance Cells Cell Area Net Area Total Area 
idea_decrypt_trojan 36437 3398598 1504511 4903109 
 
Table 4.8 IDEA decryption Trojan inserted design power result 
Instance Cells Leakage 
power 
(nW) 
Dynamic 
power(nW) 
Total 
power(nW) 
idea_decrypt_troja
n 
3643
7 
2389.40
3                   
10818556640.96
9
10818559030.37
2 
 
 
Figure 4.10 Trojan inserted IDEA decryption synthesis result 
 
 
Table 4.7 and 4.8 indicates area and power results of Trojan inserted design obtained 
from cadence RTL compiler tool. Fig. 4.10 shows the result of IDEA decryption on two 
sets of data. In Trojan inserted design the output of the IP is the first 64 bits of key for the 
set1 data. In decryption the Trojan is activated based upon input data. 
SET1 input and output data of IDEA decryption 
Inputs 
Encrypt_data: 106B_DBFD_F323_0876 
Key_in:   5A14_FB3E_021C_79E0_6081_46A0_117B_FF03 
Output: 
Original_data: 5A14_FB3E_021C_79E0 
 
SET2 input and output data of IDEA decryption 
Inputs 
Encrypt_data: E8A2_45E0_FD18_FE5C 
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Key_in:   5A14_FB3E_021C_79E0_6081_46A0_117B_FF03 
Output: 
Original_data: 6081_46A0_117B_FF03 
 
 
 
Library Encoding Method  
In library encoding design, if the netlist has any malfunction, output of the IP is 
completely different (junk) data. 
 
 
Figure 4.11 library encoding design of IDEA decryption synthesis result 
 
 
Fig. 4.11 shows the result of IDEA decryption on two sets of data. Synthesis result shows 
the Trojan is present in IP, as the output data of IP core is different from golden IP data.  
SET1 input and output data of IDEA decryption 
Inputs 
Encrypt_data: 106B_DBFD_F323_0876 
Key_in:   5A14_FB3E_021C_79E0_6081_46A0_117B_FF03 
Output: 
Original_data: 4000_4220_0018_7900 
 
SET2 input and output data of IDEA decryption 
Inputs 
Encrypt_data: E8A2_45E0_FD18_FE5C 
Key_in:   5A14_FB3E_021C_79E0_6081_46A0_117B_FF03 
55 
 
Output: 
Original_data: 4000_4220_0018_7900 
 
 
4.4.3. AES encryption 
AES encryption encrypts 128 bit input data with 128 bit key and gives out 128 bit cipher 
data. 
Golden IP 
Golden IP of AES encryption is the correct functionality of IP core. 
Table 4.9 AES encryption golden IP area result 
Instance Cells Cell Area Net Area Total Area 
aes_encrypt 227765 18606926                     9339495                        27946421 
 
Table 4.10 AES encryption golden IP power result 
Instance Cells Leakage 
power 
(nW) 
Dynamic 
power(nW) 
Total 
power(nW) 
aes_encrypt 227765 13938.709 32983951545.678 32983965484.387 
 
 
 
Figure 4.12 Golden IP AES encryption synthesis result 
  
Table 4.9 and 4.10 indicate area and power results of golden IP obtained from cadence 
RTL compiler tool. Fig. 4.12 shows the result of AES encryption on two sets of data. Set 
data are all represented in hexadecimal format.  
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SET1 input and output data of AES encryption 
Inputs 
Data_in: 0123_4567_89AB_CDEF_FEDC_BA98_7654_3210 
Key_in: 8976_F7FA_6DDA_7BC0_958E_9D74_9C17_51F0 
Output 
Cipher_data: 9BF8_4146_34BA_4396_C7FB_3580_A448_B0FF 
 
SET2 input and output data of AES encryption 
Inputs 
Data_in: 4499_AABB_CCDD_EEFF_FEDC_BA98_7654_3210 
Key_in: 9CCB_C949_EBF5_556D_96B8_CA24_194A_FC10 
Outputs 
Cipher_data: 10EB_866C_4485_E8A3_8A41_A7F8_9BF8_B9F9 
 
 
Trojan Inserted Design 
 
A two input multiplexer is inserted as a Trojan to bypass the functionality of encryption 
IP core and the Trojan is activated only with special key. 
 
Table 4.11 AES encryption Trojan inserted design area result 
Instance Cells Cell Area Net Area Total Area 
aes_encrypt_trojan 228477 18732370 9370214 28102584 
 
Table 4.12 AES encryption Trojan inserted design power result 
Instance Cells Leakage 
power 
(nW) 
Dynamic 
power(nW) 
Total 
power(nW) 
aes_encrypt_troja
n 
22847
7 
14064.52
6 
33676038005.28
9            
33676052069.81
6 
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Figure 4.13 Trojan inserted AES encryption synthesis result 
 
Table 4.11 and 4.12 indicate area and power results of Trojan inserted design are 
obtained from cadence RTL compiler tool. Fig. 4.13 shows the result of AES encryption 
on two sets of data. In Trojan inserted design the output of the IP is the input for the set1 
data.  
 
SET1 input and output data of AES encryption 
Inputs 
Data_in: 0123_4567_89AB_CDEF_FEDC_BA98_7654_3210 
Key_in: 8976_F7FA_6DDA_7BC0_958E_9D74_9C17_51F0 
Outputs 
Cipher_data: 0123_4567_89AB_CDEF_FEDC_BA98_7654_3210 
 
 
 
SET2 input and output data of AES encryption 
Inputs 
Data_in: 4499_AABB_CCDD_EEFF_FEDC_BA98_7654_3210 
Key_in: 9CCB_C949_EBF5_556D_96B8_CA24_194A_FC10 
Outputs 
Cipher_data: 10EB_866C_4485_E8A3_8A41_A7F8_9BF8_B9F9 
 
 
Library Encoding Method 
 
In library encoding design, if the netlist has any malfunction, output of the IP is 
completely different (junk) data. 
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Figure 4.14 library encoding design of AES encryption synthesis result 
 
Fig. 4.14 shows the result of AES encryption on two sets of data. In library encoding 
design if the netlist has any malfunctioned, output of the IP is completely different data 
which means there is a malfunction design in the netlist. As set1 and set2 output data are 
not matched with golden IP, the Trojan is present in the netlist.   
 
SET1 input and output data of AES encryption 
Inputs 
Data_in: 0123_4567_89AB_CDEF_FEDC_BA98_7654_3210 
Key_in: 8976_F7FA_6DDA_7BC0_958E_9D74_9C17_51F0 
Outputs 
Cipher_data: F120_4146_00AA_4186_C6D8_3080_2440_3010 
 
SET2 input and output data of AES encryption 
Inputs 
Data_in: 4499_AABB_CCDD_EEFF_FEDC_BA98_7654_3210 
Key_in: 9CCB_C949_EBF5_556D_96B8_CA24_194A_FC10 
Outputs 
Cipher_data: F089_8228_4485_E8A3_8A40_A298_1250_3010 
 
4.4.4. AES Decryption 
 
AES decryption IP recover the original data from encrypted data using the key. Both 
encryption and decryption uses same key. 
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Golden IP 
 
Golden IP is the correct functionality of the IP core. 
 
Table 4.13 AES decryption golden IP area result 
Instance Cells Cell Area Net Area Total Area 
aes_decrypt 254187                  22952380                     10670251                      33622631 
 
Table 4.14   AES decryption golden IP power result 
Instance Cells Leakage 
power 
(nW) 
Dynamic 
power(nW) 
Total 
power(nW) 
aes_decrypt 254187                  18510.178 48205827628.577            48205846138.755 
 
 
Figure 4.15 Golden IP AES decryption synthesis result  
 
Table 4.13 and 4.14 indicates area and power results of golden IP are obtained from 
cadence RTL compiler. Fig. 4.15 shows the result of AES encryption on two sets of data. 
Decryption IP recovered the set1 and set2 cipher data using the encryption “key_in”.  
SET1 input and output data of AES decryption 
Inputs 
Cipher_data: 9BF8_4146_34BA_4396_C7FB_3580_A448_B0FF 
Key_in: 8976_F7FA_6DDA_7BC0_958E_9D74_9C17_51F0 
Output 
Original_data: 0123_4567_89AB_CDEF_FEDC_BA98_7654_3210 
 
SET2 input and output data of AES decryption 
Inputs 
60 
 
Cipher_data: 10EB_866C_4485_E8A3_8A41_A7F8_9BF8_B9F9 
Key_in: 9CCB_C949_EBF5_556D_96B8_CA24_194A_FC10 
Output 
Original_data: 4499_AABB_CCDD_EEFF_FEDC_BA98_7654_3210 
 
 
 
Trojan Inserted Design 
 
A multiplexer Trojan is added to extract only the key information by disabling the 
original data output. Trojan is only activated by the special key. 
 
Table 4.15 AES decryption Trojan inserted design area result 
Instance Cells Cell Area Net Area Total Area 
aes_decrypt_trojan 254318 22967452 10683714 33651166 
 
Table 4.16 AES decryption Trojan inserted design power result 
Instance Cells Leakage 
power 
(nW) 
Dynamic 
power(nW) 
Total 
power(nW) 
aes_decrypt_troja
n 
25431
8 
18519.43
9 
48209619496.44
8 
48209638015.88
7 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.16 Trojan inserted AES decryption synthesis result 
  
 
Table 4.15 and 4.16 indicate area and power results of Trojan inserted design are 
obtained from cadence RTL compiler. Fig. 4.16 shows the result of AES decryption on 
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two sets of data. In the Trojan inserted design the output of the IP is the key for the set1 
data.  
 
SET1 input and output data of AES decryption 
Inputs 
Cipher_data: 9BF8_4146_34BA_4396_C7FB_3580_A448_B0FF 
Key_in  : 8976_F7FA_6DDA_7BC0_958E_9D74_9C17_51F0 
Output 
Original_data: 8976_F7FA_6DDA_7BC0_958E_9D74_9C17_51F0 
 
SET2 input and output data of AES decryption 
Inputs 
Cipher_data: 10EB_866C_4485_E8A3_8A41_A7F8_9BF8_B9F9 
Key_in  : 9CCB_C949_EBF5_556D_96B8_CA24_194A_FC10 
Output 
Original_data: 4499_AABB_CCDD_EEFF_FEDC_BA98_7654_3210 
 
Library Encoding Method 
 
In the library encoding design, if the netlist has any malfunction, the output of the IP is 
completely different (junk) data. 
 
 
Figure 4.17 Library encoded AES decryption synthesis result 
 
 
Fig. 4.17 shows the result of AES encryption on two sets of data. In the library encoding 
design if the netlist has any malfunction the output of the IP changes and the output is 
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completely different data which mean there is a malfunction design in the netlist. As set1 
and set2 output data are not matched with golden IP, the Trojan is present in the netlist. 
 
SET1 input and output data of AES decryption 
Inputs 
Cipher_data: 9BF8_4146_34BA_4396_C7FB_3580_A448_B0FF 
Key_in  : 8976_F7FA_6DDA_7BC0_958E_9D74_9C17_51F0 
Output 
Original_data: 8122_4562_098A_49C0_948C_9810_1414_1010 
 
SET2 input and output data of AES decryption 
Inputs 
Cipher_data: 10EB_866C_4485_E8A3_8A41_A7F8_9BF8_B9F9 
Key_in  : 9CCB_C949_EBF5_556D_96B8_CA24_194A_FC10 
Output 
Original_data: D489_8809_C8D5_446D_9698_8A00_1040_3010 
 
 
4.5. Results summary 
 
Table 4.17 summarizes the fingerprinting and library encoding results of cryptographic IP 
cores. Area and power fingerprinting method can only specify the additional amount of 
area and power in IP due to Trojan insertion. The fingerprinting method cannot disable 
Trojan from activation.  
 
Golden IP column has the results of correct functionality of IP core. Trojan insert column 
gives the output of Trojan activated design. Library encoding column give the results 
obtained from library encoding method.  
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In library encoding method, Trojan area of even a thousandth part of design can be 
detected. The encrypted or original data output of cryptographic IP core is compared with 
the Golden IP values. If the output value is different, Trojan is present in the netlist file. 
In a Trojan free design the final output is same as golden IP values. 
 
Table 4.17 Results of IDEA, AES encryption an decryption IP cores 
IP 
core 
Trojan 
Area 
(%) 
Trojan 
Power 
(%) 
 
Golden IP 
 
Trojan insert 
 
Library Encoding 
IDEA 
Encry
-ption 
0.003 0.006 data_in: 
0123_4567_89AB_
CDEF 
Key_in:   
5A14_FB3E_021C_
79E0_6081_46A0_1
17B_FF03 
Encrypt_data: 
E8A2_45E0_FD18_
FE5C 
data_in: 
0123_4567_89AB_
CDEF 
Key_in:   
5A14_FB3E_021C_
79E0_6081_46A0_1
17B_FF03 
Encrypt_data: 
0123_4567_89AB_
CDEF 
data_in: 
0123_4567_89AB_CDEF 
Key_in:   
5A14_FB3E_021C_79E0
_6081_46A0_117B_FF03 
Encrypt_data: 
0022_4560_8908_CC4C 
IDEA 
Decry
-ption 
0.002 2e-4 Encrypt_data: 
E8A2_45E0_FD18_
FE5C 
Key_in:   
5A14_FB3E_021C_
79E0_6081_46A0_1
17B_FF03 
Original_data: 
0123_4567_89AB_
CDEF 
Encrypt_data: 
E8A2_45E0_FD18_
FE5C 
Key_in:   
5A14_FB3E_021C_
79E0_6081_46A0_1
17B_FF03 
Original_data: 
6081_46A0_117B_
FF03 
Encrypt_data: 
E8A2_45E0_FD18_FE5C 
Key_in:   
5A14_FB3E_021C_79E0
_6081_46A0_117B_FF03 
Original_data: 
4000_4220_0018_7900 
AES 
Encry
-ption 
0.005 0.02 Data_in: 
0123_4567_89AB_
CDEF_FEDC_BA9
8_7654_3210 
Key_in: 
8976_F7FA_6DDA
_7BC0_958E_9D74
_9C17_51F0 
Cipher_data: 
9BF8_4146_34BA_
4396_C7FB_3580_
A448_B0FF 
Data_in: 
0123_4567_89AB_
CDEF_FEDC_BA9
8_7654_3210 
Key_in: 
8976_F7FA_6DDA
_7BC0_958E_9D74
_9C17_51F0 
Cipher_data: 
0123_4567_89AB_
CDEF_FEDC_BA9
8_7654_3210 
Data_in: 
0123_4567_89AB_CDEF
_FEDC_BA98_7654_321
0 
Key_in: 
8976_F7FA_6DDA_7BC
0_958E_9D74_9C17_51F
0 
Cipher_data: 
F120_4146_00AA_4186_
C6D8_3080_2440_3010 
AES 8.4e-4 7.8e-6 Cipher_data: Cipher_data: Cipher_data: 
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In Trojan insertion method, the final netlist can be accessed by intruder and may 
insert a Trojan design in order to obtain secret information. Trojans bypass IP core 
functions and output can be either input data or key. Results of Trojan insert column is 
either a input data or a key. 
In Library encoding design, intruder may access encoded netlist and insert a Trojan. 
To obtain the original function IP core, the encoded netlist is decoded. The Trojan design 
in an encoded netlist altered by a decode script. Due to functional transformation of 
Trojan the decoded netlist results are always different from the golden IP values. The 
library encoding method detects a Trojan and protected IP from transmitting sensitive 
data like key and input data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Decry
-ption 
9BF8_4146_34BA_
4396_C7FB_3580_
A448_B0FF 
Key_in: 
8976_F7FA_6DDA
_7BC0_958E_9D74
_9C17_51F0 
Original_data: 
0123_4567_89AB_
CDEF_FEDC_BA9
8_7654_3210 
9BF8_4146_34BA_
4396_C7FB_3580_
A448_B0FF 
Key_in: 
8976_F7FA_6DDA
_7BC0_958E_9D74
_9C17_51F0 
Original_data: 
8976_F7FA_6DDA
_7BC0_958E_9D74
_9C17_51F 
9BF8_4146_34BA_4396_
C7FB_3580_A448_B0FF 
Key_in: 
8976_F7FA_6DDA_7BC
0_958E_9D74_9C17_51F
0 
Original_data: 
8122_4562_098A_49C0_
948C_9810_1414_1010 
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5. GUI APPLICATION FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC IP 
CORES 
 
A Graphical User Interface (GUI) is an interface with simple push or a select icon to 
interact directly with back ground user functionality. To simplify research work 
demonstration with a click control application, design a Graphical User Interface (GUI) 
application in MATLAB. This section details user selection options in GUI and its back 
ground functionality. 
GUI pane is divided into five sections as shown in Fig.5.1. 
1. Cryptography IP core: User can select any one of the four available IP 
cores 
2. Trojan Insertion: User can choose the hardware design either with Trojan 
or without Trojan. 
3. Inputs: User can pass data and key inputs to the IP core in hexadecimal 
format. 
4. Output: The output of corresponding IP core is displayed in hexadecimal 
format 
5. File Generate: User can select either VHDL or MATLAB files to generate 
6. Compute: Feed entered inputs to corresponding IP core and give the result 
in output box 
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Figure 5.1 GUI application 
 
5.1. Cryptography IP core 
In this section, users can choose AES encryption, AES decryption, IDEA 
encryption or IDEA decryption. User can only choose one of the four possible IP cores. 
Based on user selection the GUI application runs the corresponding IP core functionality 
in the background. 
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5.2. Trojan Insertion 
Trojan insertion section in GUI determines whether to include Trojan in the 
hardware designs or not. The Trojan section is useful only in generation of hardware 
design files. When the user selects “without Trojan” option the design files contain only 
the IP core functionality. If user selects “with Trojan” then the design files include 
functionality in addition to IP core. The extra added design can be any malicious design  
5.3. Inputs 
Input section of GUI contains two entries. Users can either enter “plain data” or 
“cipher data” in the First Field and “key” in the second field. For all IP cores the key field 
width is 32 hexadecimal digits or 128 binary bits. The only acceptable input data format 
for data and key fields is hexadecimal. In the data field, input string or data length can be 
either 16 or 32 hexadecimal values. Length of data field depends on the user selection of 
cryptography IP core, whenever user selects either AES encryption or decryption, the 
length of data field is 32 and is 16 for IDEA encryption and decryption selection.  
5.4. Output 
Output section has only one field which gives output of either encryption or 
decryption IP core. The output for an encryption is called as ciphered data and the output 
of decryption data is original data or recovered data. The length of output field varies 
with IP core selection. For AES cores, the length is 32 hexadecimal values, whereas 
length of IDEA is 16 hexadecimal values. 
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5.5. File Generate 
This section generates either VHDL or MATLAB files. Prior to pushing VHDL 
button, user has to select one of the cryptography IP core, Trojan selection and choose 
either VHDL or MATLAB push button. If user clicks VHDL push button, in current 
directory all the VHDL files are generated in the folder named vhdl. 
5.6. Compute 
Compute push button feeds all the data entered in GUI to the background 
MATLAB script. Script processes input data with the desired IP core functionality and 
returns the final output of cryptography IP core in the output field. 
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6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 
6.1. Conclusion 
 
The proposed pre-fabrication Trojan detection method can detect any small Trojan 
present in the IP core by library encoding method. Trojan can be detected within a 
fraction of time than the time taken for ATPG testing. 
 
AES, IDEA encryption and decryption designs are implemented on Xilinx Virtex 6 
FPGA evaluation board to ensure hardware compliance. On board debugging is 
performed using Chipscope IP cores. On virtex6 FPGA hardware, the throughputs of 
AES encryption, decryption are 8627 Mbps, 5725.2 Mbps respectively and the 
throughputs of IDEA encryption, decryption IP cores are 764.5Mbps, 771.41Mbps 
respectively. 
 
The proposed library encoding and decoding scripts are implemented in python. 
Encoding script accepts netlist file as input maps the existing functionality. Decoding 
script reads the encoded netlist and remaps the netlist to original functionality. This 
method detects a small fraction (0.0008% Trojan area) of a design. 
 
Designed a GUI in MATLAB demonstrating all the IP core functionalities and also 
generating MATLAB and VHDL files of an IP core. All the background scripts are 
written in python, an executables of python scripts are generated. 
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6.2. Future Work 
 
The proposed thesis is the Trojan detection at netlist level of design hierarchy in third 
party IP cores. In this research only combinational Trojans effects with multiplexer 
payload are considered. As a future work, test the library encoding method on all the 
kinds of Trojans and verifying the robustness of it can be done. Another future work can 
be Trojan insertion on other third party IP cores and detecting the Trojan by library 
encoding. New encoding methods can be introduced to the lower levels of IC designing.   
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APPENDIX 
AES Encryption 
Input data - 4499AABBCCDDEEFFFEDCBA9876543210 
Key input - 9CCBC949EBF5556D96B8CA24194AFC10 
 
Round 
Number 
Data Start of 
Round 
After byte 
substitution 
Ater Shift 
rows 
After Mix 
Columns 
Round Key 
Initial 
Round 
01  89  FF  bb 
23  ab  ee  aa 
45  cd  dd  99 
67  cf   cc  44 
   01  42  d6  94 
cF  ac  55  9c  
a4  8b   5F bc 
91  69  be  c9 
round 0 00  cb  29  2F 
ec  07  bb  36 
e1  46  82  25 
f6   86  72  8d 
63  1F  A5 15 
ce  c5  ea   05 
F8  5a  13  3F 
42  44  40  5d 
63  1F  A5 15 
c5  ea   05  ce 
13  3F  F8  5a   
5d  42  44  40 
dc  66  e2  79 
9a  d3  f8  3c 
67  4d  87  af 
c9  70  81  2b 
de  9c  4a  de 
aa  06  53  cf 
79  f2  ad  11 
b3  da  64  ad 
round 1 02  fa  a8  a7 
30  d5  ab  f3 
1e  bf  2a  be 
7a  aa  e5  86 
77  2d  c2  5c 
04  03  62  0d 
72  08  e5  ae 
da  ac  d9  44 
77  2d  c2  5c 
03  62  0d  04 
e5  ae  72  08   
44  da  ac  d9   
4a  88  56  65 
01  da  e2  95 
69  7d  c4  38 
F7  14  61  41 
56  ca  80  5e 
28  2e  7d  b2 
Ec  1e  b3  a2 
Ae  74  10  bd 
round 2 1c  42  d6  3b 
29  f4  9f   27 
85  63  77 9a 
59  60  71  fc 
9c  2c  f6  e2 
a5  bf  db  cc 
97  fb  f5  b8 
Cb d0  a3  b0 
9c  2c  f6  e2 
Cc  a5  bf  db 
f5  b8   97  fb 
b0  Cb d0  a3 
Bc  5d  ff  73 
4d  99  07  06 
19  da  64  54 
8e  9a  e1  3e 
65  af  2f  71 
12  3c  41  f3 
96  88  3b  99 
F6  82  92  2f 
round 3 d9  f2  d0  02 
5f  a5  46  f5 
8f  52  5f  cd 
78  18  73  11 
35  89  70  77 
Cf  06  5a  e6 
73  00  cf  bd 
Bc  ad  8f  82 
35  89  70  77 
06  5a  e6  Cf 
cf  bd  73  00 
82 Bc  ad  8f   
2d  e6  0f  2b 
F1  5d  9f  7d 
2b  6d  9c  32 
89  04  44  53 
60  cf  e0  91 
Fc  c0  81  72 
83  0b  30  a9 
55  d7  45  6a 
round 4 4d  29  ef  ba 
0d  9d  1e  0f 
A8  66  ac  9b 
Dc  d3  01  39 
E3  a5  df   f4 
D7  5e  72  76 
C2  33  91  14 
86  66  7c  12 
E3  a5  df   f4 
5e  72  76  D7 
91  14  C2  33  
12  86  66  7c   
Bc  55  9b  de 
E5  fb  08  68 
B2  6e  9c  c1 
D5  85  02  1b 
30  ff  1f   8e 
2f   ef  6e  1c 
81  8a  ba  13 
D4 03  46  2c 
72 
 
round 5 8c  aa  84  50 
Ca  14  66  74 
33  e4  26  d2 
01  86  44  37 
64  ac  5f  53 
74  fa  33  92 
C3 69  f7  b5 
7c  44  1b  9a 
64  ac  5f  53 
92  74  fa  33   
f7  b5  C3 69   
9a  7c  44  1b   
B0  df  94  48 
13  72  7a  1b 
De  6a  9c  d8 
8e   91  38  de 
 
8c  73  6c  e2 
52  bd  d3  cf 
F0  7a  c0  d3 
Cd  ce  88  a4 
round 6 3c  ac  f8  aa 
41  cf  a9  d4 
2e  10  5c  0b 
43  5f  b0  7a 
Eb  91  41  ac 
83  8a  d3  48 
31  ca  4a  2b 
1a  cf  e7  da 
Eb  91  41  ac 
8a  d3  48  83 
4a  2b  31  ca   
da  1a  cf  e7   
D8  66  a4  f0 
E0  4b  4d  13 
80  3a  21  92 
49  64  3f  73 
46  35  59  bb 
34  89  5a  95 
B9  c3  03  d0 
55  9b  13  b7 
round7 9e  53  fd  4b 
D4  c2  17  86 
39  f9  22  42 
1c  ff  2c  c4 
0b  ed  54  b3 
48  25  f0  44 
12  99  93  2c 
9c  16  71  1c 
0b  ed  54  b3 
25  f0  44  48 
93  2c  12  99 
1c  9c  16  71   
F6  7a  60  4d 
F3  fe  fc  e2 
37  fa  0e  41 
93  d3  86  fd 
Ec  d9  80  3b 
44  cd  97   02 
10  d3  d0  00 
Bf  24  37  80 
round 8 1a  a3  e0  76 
B7  33  6b  e0 
27  29  de  41 
2c   f7  b1  7d 
A2  0a  e1  38 
A9  c3  7f  e1 
Cc  a5  1d  83 
71  68  c8  ff 
A2  0a  e1  38 
c3  7f  e1  A9   
1d  83  Cc  a5   
ff   71  68  c8   
E3  67  45  fd 
E7  1b  1f  4d 
41  fb  3b  83 
C6  00  c5  cf 
80  59  d9  e2 
27  ea  7d  7f 
Dd  0e  de  de 
5d  79  4e  ce 
round 9 63  3e  9c  1f 
C0  f1  62  32 
9c  f5  e5  5d 
9b  79  8b  01 
Fb  b2  de  c0 
Ba  a1  aa  23 
De  e6  d9  4c 
14  b6  3d  7c 
Fb  b2  de  c0 
a1  aa  23  Ba 
d9  4c  De  e6 
7c  14  b6  3d   
 64  3d  e4  06 
3a  d0  ad  d2 
56  58  86  58 
C5  bc  f2  3c 
Final 9f  8f  3a  c6 
9b  7a  8e  68 
8f  14  58  be 
B9  a8  44  01 
    
 
Cipher data is 128 bits represented in hexadecimal 
“10eb866c4485e8a38a41a7f89bf8b9f9” 
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AES Decryption 
Input data - 10eb866c4485e8a38a41a7f89bf8b9f9 
Key input - 9CCBC949EBF5556D96B8CA24194AFC10 
 
Round 
Number 
Data Start of 
Round 
After byte 
substitution 
After Shift 
rows 
After Mix 
Columns 
Round Key 
Initial 
Round 
9f  8f  3a  c6 
9b  7a  8e  68 
8f  14  58  be 
B9  a8  44  01 
   64  3d  e4  06 
3a  d0  ad  d2 
56  58  86  58 
C5  bc  f2  3c 
round 0 Fb  b2  de  c0 
a1  aa  23  Ba 
d9  4c  De  e6 
7c  14  b6  3d   
63  3e  9c  1f 
f1  62  32  c0 
e5  5d  9c  f5 
01  9b  79  8b 
63  3e  9c  1f 
C0  f1  62  32 
9c  f5  e5  5d 
9b  79  8b  01 
A2  0a  e1  38 
C3  7f  e1  a9 
1d  83  cc  a5 
Ff  71  68  c8 
80  59  d9  e2 
27  ea  7d  7f 
Dd  0e  de  de 
5d  79  4e  ce 
round 1 E3  67  45  fd 
E7  1b  1f  4d 
41  fb  3b  83 
C6  00  c5  cf 
1a  a3  e0  76 
33  6b  e0  B7   
de  41  27  29   
7d  2c   f7  b1   
 1a  a3  e0  76 
B7  33  6b  e0 
27  29  de  41 
2c   f7  b1  7d 
0b  ed  54  b3 
25  f0  44  48 
93  2c  12  99 
1c  9c  16  71   
Ec  d9  80  3b 
44  cd  97   02 
10  d3  d0  00 
Bf  24  37  80 
round 2 F6  7a  60  4d 
F3  fe  fc  e2 
37  fa  0e  41 
93  d3  86  fd 
9e  53  fd  4b 
c2  17  86  D4   
22  42  39  f9   
C4  1c  ff  2c  
9e  53  fd  4b 
D4  c2  17  86 
39  f9  22  42 
1c  ff  2c  c4 
Eb  91  41  ac 
8a  d3  48  83 
4a  2b  31  ca   
da  1a  cf  e7   
46  35  59  bb 
34  89  5a  95 
B9  c3  03  d0 
55  9b  13  b7 
round 3 D8  66  a4  f0 
E0  4b  4d  13 
80  3a  21  92 
49  64  3f  73 
3c  ac  f8  aa 
cf  a9  d4  41  
5c  0b 2e  10 
7a  43  5f  b0   
 3c  ac  f8  aa 
41  cf  a9  d4 
2e  10  5c  0b 
43  5f  b0  7a 
64  ac  5f  53 
92  74  fa  33   
f7  b5  C3 69   
9a  7c  44  1b   
8c  73  6c  e2 
52  bd  d3  cf 
F0  7a  c0  d3 
Cd  ce  88  a4 
round 4 B0  df  94  48 
13  72  7a  1b 
De  6a  9c  d8 
8e   91  38  de 
8c  aa  84  50 
14  66  74  Ca   
26  d2  33  e4   
37  01  86  44   
8c  aa  84  50 
Ca  14  66  74 
33  e4  26  d2 
01  86  44  37 
E3  a5  df   f4 
5e  72  76  D7 
91  14  C2  33  
12  86  66  7c   
30  ff  1f   8e 
2f   ef  6e  1c 
81  8a  ba  13 
D4 03  46  2c 
round 5 Bc  55  9b  de 
E5  fb  08  68 
B2  6e  9c  c1 
D5  85  02  1b 
4d  29  ef  ba 
9d  1e  0f  0d   
ac  9b  A8  66   
39  Dc  d3  01 
4d  29  ef  ba 
0d  9d  1e  0f 
A8  66  ac  9b 
Dc  d3  01  39 
35  89  70  77 
06  5a  e6  Cf 
cf  bd  73  00 
82 Bc  ad  8f   
60  cf  e0  91 
Fc  c0  81  72 
83  0b  30  a9 
55  d7  45  6a 
74 
 
round 6 2d  e6  0f  2b 
F1  5d  9f  7d 
2b  6d  9c  32 
89  04  44  53 
d9  f2  d0  02 
a5  46  f5  5f 
5f  cd   8f  52   
11 78  18  73   
d9  f2  d0  02 
5f  a5  46  f5 
8f  52  5f  cd 
78  18  73  11 
9c  2c  f6  e2 
Cc  a5  bf  db 
f5  b8   97  fb 
b0  Cb d0  a3 
65  af  2f  71 
12  3c  41  f3 
96  88  3b  99 
F6  82  92  2f 
round7 Bc  5d  ff  73 
4d  99  07  06 
19  da  64  54 
8e  9a  e1  3e 
1c  42  d6  3b 
f4  9f   27  29 
77 9a   85  63   
Fc  59  60  71 
1c  42  d6  3b 
29  f4  9f   27 
85  63  77 9a 
59  60  71  fc 
77  2d  c2  5c 
03  62  0d  04 
e5  ae  72  08   
44  da  ac  d9   
56  ca  80  5e 
28  2e  7d  b2 
Ec  1e  b3  a2 
Ae  74  10  bd 
round 8 4a  88  56  65 
01  da  e2  95 
69  7d  c4  38 
F7  14  61  41 
02  fa  a8  a7 
d5  ab  f3  30   
2a  be  1e  bf   
86  7a  aa  e5   
02  fa  a8  a7 
30  d5  ab  f3 
1e  bf  2a  be 
7a  aa  e5  86 
63  1F  A5 15 
c5  ea   05  ce 
13  3F  F8  5a   
5d  42  44  40 
de  9c  4a  de 
aa  06  53  cf 
79  f2  ad  11 
b3  da  64  ad 
round 9 dc  66  e2  79 
9a  d3  f8  3c 
67  4d  87  af 
c9  70  81  2b 
00  cb  29  2F 
07  bb  36  ec   
82  25  e1  46   
8d  f6   86  72 
00  cb  29  2F 
ec  07  bb  36 
e1  46  82  25 
f6   86  72  8d 
 01  42  d6  94 
cF  ac  55  9c  
a4  8b   5F bc 
91  69  be  c9 
Final 01  89  FF  bb 
23  ab  ee  aa 
45  cd  dd  99 
67  cf   cc  44 
    
 
Cipher data is 128 bits represented in hexadecimal 
“4499AABBCCDDEEFFFEDCBA9876543210” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
75 
 
IDEA Encryption 
Key in – 8B429D1BF01179C1E09C014445EFA83B 
Data in – 0123456789ABCDEF 
Sub keys for Encryption 
Key0 –  8B42 Key26 –7D41 
Key1 –  9D1B Key27 –DC5A 
Key2 –  F011 Key28 –14E8 
Key3 –  79C1 Key29 –DF80 
Key4 –  E09C Key30 –8BCE 
Key5 –  0144 Key31 –0F04 
Key6 –  45EF Key32 –5EFA 
Key7 –  A83B Key33 –83B8 
Key8 –  37E0 Key34 –B429 
Key9 –  22F3 Key35 –D1BF 
Key10 –83C1 Key36 –0117 
Key11 –3802 Key37 –9C1E 
Key12 –888B Key38 –09C0 
Key13 –DF50 Key39 –1444 
Key14 –7716 Key40 –7168 
Key15 –853A Key41 –53A3 
Key16 –E707 Key42 –7E02 
Key17 –8270 Key43 –2F38 
Key18 –0511 Key44 –3C13 
Key19 –17BE Key45 –8028 
Key20 –A0EE Key46 –88BD 
Key21 –2D0A Key47 –F507 
Key22 –746F Key48 –46FC 
Key23 –C045 Key49 –045E 
Key24 –E00A Key50 –7078 
Key25 –222F Key51 –2700 
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IDEA Encryption 
Round Output Data 
1 E599      D74D      190B      2DB6 
2 13C2      1B36      9CBE      6AB3 
3 B696      1A8F      4B3A      45B4 
4 5D15      BB64      3F30      5DB8 
5 91F7      9CDB      A2E4      BD71 
6 0A66      49B4      368D      0792 
7 D603      C351      B129      3ED4 
8 15BC      4430      E353      A077 
Final C70A      E7B1     B4A8     088E 
 
Encrypted data: C70AE7B1B4A8088E 
 
Sub keys for decryption 
 –  E03E -Key26 –82BF 
-Key1 –  62E5  –CD35 
-Key2 –  0FEF Key28 –14E8 
 Key3﷩−1﷩ –  7B7B Key29 –DF80 
Key4 –  E09C  –4AF1 
Key5 –  0144 -Key31 –F0FC 
 –  0BED -Key32 –A106 
-Key7 –  57C5  Key33﷩−1﷩ –E5A3 
-Key8 –  C820 Key34 –B429 
 –  71A7 Key35 –D1BF 
Key10 –83C1  –092D 
Key11 –3802 -Key37 –63E2 
 Key12﷩−1﷩ –2C24 -Key38 –F640 
-Key13 –20B0  –7532 
-Key14 –88EA Key40 –7168 
 –0062 Key41 –53A3 
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Key16 –E707  Key42﷩−1﷩ –523E 
Key17 –8270 -Key43 –D0C8 
 –D4C7 -Key44 –C3ED 
-Key19 –E842  –4DC6 
-Key20 –5F12 Key46 –88BD 
 Key21﷩−1﷩ –1BB0 Key47 –F507 
Key22 –746F  –BF3E 
Key23 –C045 -Key49 –FBA2 
 –B65C -Key50 –8F88 
-Key25 –DDD1  Key51﷩−1﷩ –F96A 
 
 
 
IDEA Decryption 
Round Output Data 
1 15BC      4430      E353      A077 
2 D603      C351      B129      3ED4 
3 0A66      49B4      368D      0792 
4 91F7      9CDB      A2E4     BD71 
5 5D15      BB64      3F30      5DB8 
6 B696      1A8F      4B3A      45B4 
7 13C2      1B36       9CBE     6AB3 
8 E599      D74D      190B      2DB6 
Final 0123       4567       89AB     CDEF 
 
Original Data: 0123456789ABCDEF 
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